TL 2143

Peacemaking Initiatives for East Timor

MISKA GRAPHICS

Report on a Conference on East Timor held at the
Australian National University,
10-12 July 1995

Published by
East Timor Talks Campaign

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The East Timor Talks Campaign is an independent, community-based initiative established to promote a resolution of the East Timor conflict through dialogue under UN auspices involving all parties to the conflict.

The Campaign is endorsed by: Australian Council for Overseas Aid; Bob Brown; Sr Veronica Brady; Hon John Dowd, QC; Martin Ferguson; Tom Uren; Bill Armstrong; Dr Keith Suter; Janet Powell; Rev Dr Sandy Yule; Philip Adams; Jo Vallentine; James Dunn; Justice Marcus Einfeld; Prof Peter Singer; Heather Southcott, AM; Fr Bob Maguire AM; Dr Joe Camilleri; Sr Angela Ryan; Judith Wright; David Scott; Bishop Paul Moore Jr; John Wheeldon; Dr Jocelynne Scutt; Frank Brennan, SJ; Hon Michael Kirby; Bob Debus; Russell Rollason; David Suzuki; Justice Elizabeth Evatt, AO; Noam Chomsky; Thomas Keneally; Stella Cornelius, AO OBE; Timothy Mo; Rodney Hall; Elsa Atkin; Rev Richard Wootton; Prof Garth Nettheim; Dr Ross Fitzgerald; Kaz Cooke; Rev Dorothy McMahon; Bill Ethell; David Shinnick; Senator John Coulter; Dr David Armstrong; Dr Hilary Charlesworth; Dr Judy Henderson; Prof Charles Birch; Faith Bandler; Tom Kelly; Mollie Missen; Bishop Bryan Kyme; Sr Janet Mead; Dr Richard Tanter; Michael Sullivan OAM; Bishop Hilton Deakin, Senator Sid Spindler

...

Co-ordinator: Pat Walsh
East Timor Talks Campaign, Fitzroy Vic 3065. Australia.
Tel (03) 9417 7505 Fax (03) 9416 2746

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Foreword

Dr Michael Salla

Conference aims

The conference aimed to describe and discuss a wide range of initiatives currently underway to resolve the ongoing conflict in East Timor. It was hoped that presenting the initiatives in a conference format would stimulate debate, cooperation and awareness that could contribute to the effectiveness of these initiatives, thereby enhancing the peacemaking process for East Timor.

Dynamics and Organisation

Held over three days, July 10-12 1995, the conference attracted over 150 registrants of whom 27 gave papers at plenary sessions. The conference was divided into nine plenary sessions, three workshop sessions, and a final panel session. Rapporteurs were appointed for each of the workshop sessions. For the first two workshop sessions, rapporteurs were asked to facilitate discussion on themes raised in the plenary sessions, and to report back to the conference rapporteur, Tony O'Connor. The last of the workshop sessions comprised four broad categories of initiatives that were open for discussion. The final session heard from the rapporteurs of the previous session, the conference rapporteur, and rapporteurs from earlier workshops who wished to elaborate on any of the initiatives that were raised.

The conference organising committee comprised **Dr Harold Crouch** (Australian National University); **Dr Herb Feith** (Monash University), **Gerry van Klinken** (Griffith University), **Pat Walsh** (Australian Council for Overseas Aid); and the conference convenor, **Dr Michael Salla** (Australian National University). The committee communicated by phone, fax and email over the months preceding the conference, and met as a body immediately prior to and during the conference. Conference participants were encouraged to contact committee members for any concerns regarding the conference.

Outcome of the Conference

The outcome of the conference in terms of its overall value and effectiveness for ultimately resolving the East Timor conflict lies in four areas.

First is the awareness generated by individuals and groups hearing at first hand of the initiatives undertaken by others to resolve the East Timor conflict. This led to an exchange of ideas and informal discussion that could serve as likely foundations for future collaboration. This was exemplified by recent news that Oporto University will collaborate with several other Australian universities in a series of conferences and workshops in 1996.

Second, the conference provided the opportunity for 'experts in the field' simply to get to know one another. This leads to improved communication of, and cooperation in, their respective initiatives.

Third, there is the issue of empowerment. The fact that the question of East Timor can still bring together a wide array of individuals at an international forum such as this highlights that the question is still alive, and that individuals and organisations are not alone in pursuing their initiatives.

Finally, the enclosed session summaries will serve as a concrete resource for all who wish to learn of the many initiatives currently underway to resolve the East Timor conflict, and what is needed for the future. More importantly, the summaries will enable the reader to briefly glimpse the concerns and interests of a small portion of humanity who found that the unresolved issue of East Timor's future could bring them together despite a wide range of political preferences and world views. In this sense the conference was a microcosm of global society.

Acknowledgements
Many thanks must be extended to the sponsors of the conference who made it possible to fund a number of international visitors. There were seven institutional sponsors, four of which were prepared to have this acknowledged on the public record. These were the Department of Political Science (Australian National University); Faculty of Arts (Australian National University); Oporto University; and the Peace Research Centre (Australian National University). The administrative and financial support provided by these institutions attest to the strong interest East Timor provides for the Australian community, and a continuing desire to resolve this long running conflict.

The organising committee is especially indebted to the conference rapporteur, Tony O'Connor, who spent many hours summarising and transcribing the conference sessions for this report. We are also grateful to Sharon Merten who cheerfully combined the administrative chores of the conference with her numerous departmental duties, as well as devoting much of her own time to ensure the success of the conference. We also appreciate the efforts of who helped in the various sessions and preparations for the conference: Anthony Burke, Michael McKenzie, Simon Philpott, Jenny Salla-Lowe and Christine Wilson. Finally, thanks to those delegates who agreed to act as chairpersons or rapporteurs for the conference sessions. ❋

1. Keynote address

East Timor in the International System

Professor Richard Falk (Princeton University)

Professor Falk examined Indonesia's actions in East Timor within the context of modern international law, the 'cruelty of geopolitics' and the importance of the trans-national human rights movement. There is a tension in international law - on the one hand aggression and the use of force are condemned but it allows the de facto recognition of realities regardless of how they are acquired.

Australians have reacted particularly strongly to their government's ambivalent and opportunistic policy which insists that Indonesia captured East Timor illegally but still enters into arrangements with Indonesia. Many Australians see the Governments failure to implement its own rhetoric as a betrayal of society's values - the Government's reaction diminishes their sense of who Australians are and what they stand for. After all democracy is expressed through symbolic moral challenges to authority.

Falk asked why the international responses to East Timor and Kuwait were so different. After all, East Timor is a juster cause than Kuwait which had an oppressive, decadent and corrupt elite. There are two possible explanations:

1. The 'innocent explanation': Kuwait happened later when the ethos of self-determination was stronger. The Cold War was over and the

UN was able to respond in accord with the UN Charter.

2. 'The cruelty of geo-politics': meaning that claims by subordinated peoples are not being treated equally. Political behaviour is shaped by capitalism and the threat to the hegemony of international economic interests. In Kuwait the US was afraid Saddam Hussein might withdraw from Kuwait and take away the excuse of having a go at him. The Kurds have been sacrificed to the unity of Iraq and the containment of Iran.

The geopolitical influences in 1975 were quite different - the US then wanted to maintain links between Asian states and an anti-Soviet alliance. East Timor was wrongly seen by the CIA as an emerging anti-Western country.

However the geo-political priorities of the US and Britain were successfully challenged in South Africa. Falk believes that it would be easier for Indonesia to shift its position than it was for de Klerk to shift in South Africa. Political elites are out of touch with the transnational human rights movement and do not recognize that international society sees East Timor as a painful interruption in the dynamics of decolonization. The Australian Government, for one, has tried to have it both ways (as usual) and has let it get out of hand.

Diplomacy is now replacing armed struggle as a way of pursuing justice and successes for this 'normative approach' in the Philippines, El Salvador and Ireland have encouraged the search for reconciliation processes. There are suggestions that some members of the Indonesian elite are prepared to move from the battlefield to the negotiating table. Overall Falk concluded that the options for dispossessed people need not be restricted by 'geo-political determinism' but warned that patience is not a virtue when one is dealing with oppressive regimes. ✵

2.

Indonesian military perspectives on East Timor

Liem Soei Liong (TAPOL)
Dr Peter Carey (Oxford University)
Bob Lowry (Australian Defence Force Academy)

This session examined differing political views in ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia: Indonesian Armed Forces) and how it would react to different ways to achieve a peaceful solution in East Timor.

Bob Lowry said East Timor has been an ABRI project from 1975. Even today the army controls the political, social and economic life of East Timor in a way that is quite different from any other Indonesian province. Few army officers appreciate the international criticism that Suharto and Indonesian diplomats face. For them East Timor is conquered although many know how much the East Timorese dislike ABRI.

Liem Soei Liong noted that military service in East Timor is no longer automatically helpful for reaching senior positions and the current senior commanders are not old East Timor 'hands'. For example, General Panjaitan (the regional commander in Bali at the time of Santa Cruz) was the most highly decorated officer in the army and was widely expected to become ABRI commander. Instead he was forced to retire. Warouw, Mantiri, Syafei and Hendropriyono are other officers whose career suffered. He believed that soldiers in East Timor were demoralized.

Lowry described attitudes within ABRI to its present detailed involvement in politics. One group wants this to continue, another to step back and maintain a balance between civilian politicians; a third, currently favoured by Suharto, wants ABRI to become a professional army which accepts overall civilian control. He examined ABRI's reaction to possible solutions for East Timor with the proviso that they all require considerable political will by either President Suharto or his successor. Suharto wants a seventh term in 1998 and is unlikely to antagonize any important group in ABRI. His successor will also need wide support.

Lowry thought that army morale is not a problem. At present troop levels, each Indonesian battalion only has to go to East Timor once every eight years. Conditional independence (where East Timor agrees not to have a navy or airforce or to support independence movements in other parts of Indonesia) might be accepted by ABRI if it received sufficient inducement such as increased resources.

Another option is 'decentralization'. The Indonesian Government has started to experiment with a weak type of decentralization which would hardly satisfy the basic grievances of the East Timorese. Most East Timorese would want decentralization to include major changes such as subordination of the local military to a Governor acceptable to the majority of the people, a legal system which is respected and which enforces human rights and the control of most civil service positions by East Timorese. These changes would seem to be important even if the army seeks to make the status quo of integration acceptable to most East Timorese. All of them require considerable political will by President Suharto or his successor.

Peter Carey discussed whether the 'Sulawesi solution', involving a ceasefire combined with amnesty arrengements and an honourable role for local leaders in the post-rebellion settlement could indicate a possible way forward for Jakarta given the present political impasse on East Timor. However he was less hopeful that there were groups within ABRI who might accept a political settlement. He believes ABRI is enormously arrogant and that civil disorder in the territory may force the reimposition of martial law and a return of the pre-1989 'closed region' status. ⁂

3.

Regional and People's Initiatives

Pat Walsh (Australian Council for Overseas Aid)
Prof Barbedo Magalhaes (Oporto University)
Herbin Siahaan (Joint Committee for the Defence of the East Timorese)
Renato Constantino (Asia-Pacific Coalition for East Timor)

Pat Walsh considered that the issue, after a long and difficult period in the 1980s, had now become self-propelling. However, East Timorese and their supporters still needed to work hard to set an environment that will enable progress to be made toward an acceptable solution. The history of the issue demonstrates that action by civil society has been essential if there is to be movement at the top - whether in unions, churches, media or politically. Although public opinion has changed, politically the issue is bogged down in Australia and Indonesia with Senator Evans admitting that his efforts have produced little. NGOs need to lobby all sides of politics and to look also for international Church initiatives and to support multilateral actions by Governments.

Barbedo de Magalhaes examined public discussion of East Timor in Portugal. Between 1976 and 1986, Portugal's desire to enter the European Union (EU) made the government very quiet on East Timor. The first Oporto University conference on East Timor was held in 1986 and since then the annual meetings have been attended by politicians from the USA, Australia and Portugal and by members of the Indonesian democracy movement. The Oporto conference believes that similar conferences should be held in other parts of the world and it strongly supported the Manila Asia-Pacific conference on East Timor held in 1994.

Renato Constantino spoke of the planning and legacy of the 1994

Manila conference. Despite heavy pressure from Indonesia and President Ramos's ban on many foreign delegates in 'the national interest', 51 delegates from 20 countries attended this first example of 'South-South' solidarity on East Timor. Even Indonesia's threat of economic retaliation was hollow because Philippine purchases from Indonesia are 7 times those of Indonesia from the Philippines. But the meeting showed that, however good the economic rationale for ASEAN South-South cooperation, the peoples of the region will not endorse their governments' conspiracy of silence on East Timor. The Asia Pacific Conference on East Timor lead to the formation of the Asia-Pacific Coalition on East Timor and another conference is planned for December 1995.

Finally **Herbin Siahaan** discussed an initiative by Indonesian organizations to help East Timorese. After the Santa Cruz killings in November 1991, East Timorese in Dili and Jakarta appealed to the Indonesian Legal Aid foundation (LBH) for assistance. LBH approached the Indonesian Council of Churches (representing the Protestant churches) and Caritas Indonesia (for the Catholic Church) and together they formed the Joint Committee for the Defence of East Timorese in February 1992. The Joint Committee seeks to defend East Timorese political prisoners in court and to assist their families economically, to monitor human rights in East Timor and to raise awareness about East Timor in Indonesia. To this end they are now approaching Muslim organizations in Indonesia to join the Joint Committee. However, they face many obstacles in East Timor because of the intervention of 'extra-judicial institutions' (the army) at all stages of the legal process. This year they have seen examples of torture of political prisoners and have found that these prisoners have been pressured into refusing their legal assistance. In East Timor, even the police are intimidated by military intelligence. The Joint Committee believes that three essential reforms to improve respect for human rights in East Timor are access for independent organizations, an end to illegal arrests by the armed forces and the elimination of all forms of torture. ⁂

4.

Autonomy

Agio Pereira (East Timor Relief Association)
Dr Michael van Langenberg (Sydney University)
Dr Herb Feith (Monash University)

This was a key session. The idea of 'autonomy' for East Timor was widely discussed at the conference and this session set a framework for these ideas.

Agio Pereira reviewed the three phase peace plan which was proposed by the National Council for Maubere Resistance (CNRM) in 1992 .

* The first phase (lasting about two years) would lead to a ceasefire in East Timor and the withdrawal of most Indonesian forces. Political activity and a free press would be allowed in East Timor and the UN, through a resident representative, would be able to supervise a census and the resettlement of displaced East Timorese back to their ancestral lands.

* In the second phase the indigenous people of East Timor would elect a local Assembly to oversee their internal affairs, immigration laws and trade relations for 5 years. All remaining Indonesian troops and most Indonesian civil servants would withdraw and finally there would be a referendum. If East Timorese choose independence, East Timor would join ASEAN and the South Pacific Forum and its neutrality would be guaranteed by the Security Council and ASEAN.

CNRM sees this plan as an honourable way for the Indonesian Government to extract itself from the East Timor quagmire but it also realizes that so far Indonesia does not see the political need for direct negotiations with the East Timorese resistance.

The CNRM peace plan has some similarities with the Israel-Palestinian peace agreements. When the Cold War ended, both the USA and the USSR realized that they needed good relations with all parties in the Middle East and they were prepared to get really involved in peace negotiations. The peace plan proposes that in the first 5 years, Israeli forces withdraw from Gaza and Jericho and a Palestinian authority takes over the internal affairs of the West Bank leading to the election of a Palestinian Council and an agreement on permanent status by 1999.

But so far neither the USA, the EU or Japan have shown strong support for the UNSG's modest efforts in East Timor and the end of the Cold War has not reduced Indonesia's economic attractiveness to the West. So the CNRM diplomatic front will do everything possible to increase the cost on Indonesia until it is willing to negotiate a genuine solution for East Timor. The CNRM would welcome USA, EU, Japan or the ASEAN Secretary-General as co-presidents of the UN sponsored talks.

Michael van Langenberg outlined Indonesian domestic politics. The three priorities for the Government are economic development fuelled by growth, managing cultural diversity ('Unity in Diversity') and maintaining one nation by a high level of internal security. But there is a contradiction between Indonesian law (Basic Law No. 5, 1974) which says that the local government may control any matters apart from defense, foreign affairs, monetary issues and the legal system and the reality that real power has become centralized in the President, the central bureaucracy and the larger economic oligopolies during the 1970s and 1980s. But now many economic controls have been relaxed so that Indonesia can join the international capitalist economy and this increases pressure for a decentralized political system in which civilians control the army and security policy.

The Government is very cautious - it fears that greater autonomy might lead to a break-up of Indonesia (like the USSR) and it wants a peaceful transition after Suharto. So far it has proposed a small trial for decentralized administration in 26 *kabupaten*s (administrative regions within a province). What about East Timor ? It was absorbed into a highly centralized Indonesia and it is not clear what effect the release of East Timor would have on Indonesia itself. The cure for East Timor may well be that re-constructing the Indonesian state will produce quite new options for East Timor.

Herb Feith took up the idea of an internationally guaranteed autonomy for East Timor. Many East Timorese nationalists are suspicious of the idea of 'autonomy' but they have taken it more seriously after Bishop Belo proposed that Puerto Rico's relation to the US or the Azores' relation to Portugal is one option that East Timorese might choose in a UN sponsored referendum.

Indonesia already has a constitutional concept of *daerah istimewa* that might be useful for East Timor. This special status for a province has so far only been given to Yogyakarta and Aceh (although the special development zone at Batam island near Singapore might receive it). Aceh was given autonomy over matters of religion, customary law and education as part of a settlement of an Islamic uprising from 1953 to 1962. This arrangement was negotiated with Daud Beureh, a respected leader of both the uprising and the anti-Dutch struggle in Aceh. But in reality, this special status is at the discretion of the Central Government and has meant little in recent years. Some East Timorese reject such a vague notion but Feith notes that the middle stage of the CNRM peace plan is a possible form of a 'special region' concept.

Autonomy negotiations would have to cover issues like demilitarization, the future of recent Indonesian migrants and control of East Timor's oil and a final agreement would need to be internationally guaranteed - it ought not to vanish *a la* Aceh. Although East Timorese respect the efforts of the UN Secretary General for East Timor they will also see that the UN alone, after Bosnia and Somalia, cannot assure any settlement and they have little reason to trust Indonesia, particularly in a post-Suharto leadership which might be rather unstable.

Herb Feith also looked at the broader question of how to handle the many claims for self-determination (eg not just East Timor but also Tibet and Kurdistan). The breakup of the USSR and former Yugoslavia has alarmed many states and they would like to restore the taboo on boundary change but no one yet knows how to generate reform within states where there is a cycle of repression and resistance. Possible solutions include 'power sharing', 'homeland', 'authority', 'intergovernmental commission' (between London and Dublin), 'double flags' (in Australia). The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs has already made a major contribution with its 'Red Book' on Cambodia and the 'Blue Book' on UN reform. Another could be a serious study of ways to evaluate claims for self-determination and what solutions are available.

Finally, **Feith** compared East Timor and South Africa. He compared the situation of Nelson Mandela and Archbishop Tutu before Mandela's release with that of Xanana Gusmao and Bishop Belo - they both have moral authority but they do not compete with each other. But who is Indonesia's de Klerk ? De Klerk could act because reformist groups in the National Party could see that South Africa was stuck. Some Indonesian army officers and civilian politicians have shown that they realize the difficult position and among the East Timorese people those who had opposed Portuguese colonial rule and initially supported *integrasi* may also have an important role to play.

These ideas were taken up in a workshop on 'autonomy'. The consensus was that freedom and self-determination for the people of East Timor is central to either integration or independence but there were many uncertainties about the precise meaning of the term 'autonomy'. For example, it should include self-determination in health, education and culture and a freedom from fear and coercion by real de-militarization. It is important to define the elements of autonomy, how it would be implemented and the international controls that would accompany it.

There were different views about the acceptability of 'autonomy' to people within East Timor. Some believed that it would be hard for many people in East Timor to accept autonomy within Indonesia after a third of the population had died from starvation and war-related deaths after the Indonesian invasion. Others thought that many would accept some form of autonomy if it involved the withdrawal of Indonesian forces and guarantees of East Timorese control. They felt that approval from Xanana Gusmao and Bishop Belo would ensure internal acceptance and stability. ⁂

5.

Australian Foreign Policy

Miles Kupa (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade)
Dr Harold Crouch (Australian National University)
Professor Geoffrey Gunn (Nagoya University)

Miles Kupa reviewed the Australian Government's policy on East Timor. The Australian Government tried to encourage a peaceful decolonization process in 1974 and 1975 and urged Portugal to involve the UN in the process. The Australian Government does not approve of the way in which East Timor was incorporated into Indonesia and it does not recognize the request for integration with Indonesia of 31 May 1976 by the so-called 'People's Assembly of East Timor' as a valid act of self-determination on the part of the East Timorese people.

Australian Government policy is based on three points:

1. *De jure* recognition (since 1979) of Indonesian sovereignty in East Timor (because, the Government says, it could only help the people of East Timor by accepting the reality of Indonesian control).

2. An acknowledgment of the right of the East Timorese people to self-determination (although how this might be exercised is a matter for the UN working with the parties concerned). Self-determination can have many forms but the ultimate test is whether the people have greater influence over their political, economic and social conditions.

3. Strong support for measures to protect the human rights and to promote the welfare of the East Timorese people. The Australian Government plans to provide $30 million in aid to East Timor between

1994 and 1998.

The Government believes that the fundamental problem is the military's oppressive presence and its extensive involvement in the local economy. Unemployment and competition for jobs from newcomers from Sulawesi and Java add to the problem. It is concerned that the situation has deteriorated since 1994 and fears that improvements will be slow. It also wishes that there had been more progress in the UN sponsored talks between Portugal and Indonesia and it hopes that the all-inclusive talks just held in Austria between East Timorese groups will continue.

The Government believes that it had an obligation to claim and exploit that part of the oil resources in the Timor Sea to which it believed Australia was entitled under international law and, in 1979 when the situation in East Timor seemed irreversible, it decided to negotiate an agreed sea border with Indonesia. These negotiations led to the signing of the Timor Gap Treaty in 1989. Finally, although the situation in East Timor is not as Australians would wish the Government believes that it can have the greatest influence if there is a strong bilateral relationship in which the Indonesian Government also has a significant investment.

Harold Crouch posed the question 'What can Australia do about East Timor ?' Although most people agree that Indonesia should leave East Timor there is little evidence that they will go and it would be a mistake to base Australian foreign policy on this assumption. Withdrawal is unlikely because the central government really believes that it won militarily in East Timor and that, even if it had not, withdrawal would cause military morale to crumble and other provinces to conclude that the central government was weak.

He sketched three simplified options - take a hard public line, put good relations with Indonesia before all else (particularly nuisance issues like human rights) or see foreign policy as a complex issue. He argued that supporters of the first line have not shown that it will be effective even though he agreed that the 'softly-softly' approach had not achieved results. **Crouch** opted for a low-key approach and for placing an emphasis on human rights and autonomy, restrictions on defence links with Indonesia, a liberal policy toward refugees from East Timor and being less enthusiastic to assist Indonesia get off the diplomatic hook in Washington or at the UN.

Finally **Geoffrey Gunn** looked at options for UN involvement in East Timor. The UN has been reduced to setting up talks between East Timorese groups and chairing meetings between Portugal and Indonesia. But it really has a 'peace-building' role in East Timor - the last resolution passed by the UN General Assembly in 1982 which called on the UN agencies to assist the people of East Timor and on the UN Secretary General to achieve a 'comprehensive settlement of the problem'.

What are the lessons of recent UN operations ?

* Peace building can include disarming warring parties, protecting human rights, repatriating refugees, monitoring elections and rebuilding civil society (Namibia, Western Sahara, Cambodia and El Salvador all provide recent examples). In the Western Sahara, the UN has taken a particularly active role in proposing a peace plan and later this year it will conduct a referendum which excludes recent Moroccan arrivals but includes Saharan refugees in Algeria.

* Regional organizations like ASEAN and the OAU have played a major role in supporting 'peace-building' in Cambodia, Namibia and Western Sahara. By contrast ASEAN and the South Pacific Forum have stood well back from East Timor.

* In Mozambique, the UN arranged World Bank economic support.

A future UN role in East Timor should include carefully planning for support functions (health, agriculture etc), for elections, repatriation of refugees and the roles of human rights monitors, civil police and military contingents. One option might be that the UN could establish a transitional authority for East Timor (as for Cambodia) which could administer East Timor as a trust territory for a limited time.

East Timorese groups should also have contingency plans for referendums and the future leadership and political institutions of East Timor (including the need for a constitutional convention). Finally **Gunn** suggested that East Timor might, like Haiti, refuse to create its own army. Perhaps after so many years of militarization, a civil police force might suffice if East Timor's security as a neutral non-aligned state was internationally guaranteed. ⁂

6.

Parliamentary and Governmental Initiatives

H.E. Goulart de Avila (Ambassador of Portugal)
Senator Vicky Bourne (Australian Democrats)
Garrie Gibson MHR (Australian Labor Party)
Sidney Jones (Human Rights Watch/Asia)

Rui Goulart de Avila said that Portugal accepts its share of responsibility for the events of 1975 but rejects the accusation that it abandoned East Timor. After the 1974 Portuguese revolution, the new Government had four territories to decolonize. In Africa, there were well-established liberation fronts in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau but in East Timor there had been no war and there were differing views amongst the East Timorese. Portugal wanted to give the East Timorese a free choice but was hampered by political instability at home, by a civil war which left most of East Timor under Fretilin control and by outside efforts which sought to thwart Portuguese efforts.

Between 1976 and 1982, Portugal obtained clear UN resolutions that urged Indonesia to withdraw and to allow the decolonization process to proceed peacefully. But Indonesia rejected these resolutions and support in the UN dropped even as evidence of appalling human rights violations became known. The 1982 resolution asked the UN Secretary General to initiate talks between Portugal and Indonesia. Talks from 1984-1986 produced some progress on family reunions but the gap on the real issue was so wide that the talks ceased in 1986. Portugal was able to raise East Timor in many other forums after it joined the EU in 1986. In 1988 the Indonesian Parliament invited the Portuguese Parliament to send a delegation to East Timor but this was cancelled at the last minute in October 1991 over a disagreement on practical arrangements

World attention returned to East Timor after November 12, 1991 and in January 1992, Portugal proposed that the UN chair meetings involving Indonesia and all interested parties without any pre-conditions to achieve a just and internationally settlement. The five meetings to date have concentrated on defining confidence building measures, particularly those that would improve the human rights situation and involve East Timorese. This led to the recent all inclusive talks between East Timorese in Austria (see Appendix 2). Portugal stresses that the East Timor question is first and foremost caused by Indonesia's failure to observe basic principles of international law. Portugal will participate constructively in UN talks because it wants the decolonization process completed in accord with the UN Charter and UN resolutions.

Vicki Bourne examined the decolonization process in the Pacific and particularly in New Caledonia where a referendum is set for 1998. She discussed the different ways that Parliaments can help - debates and parliamentary questions keep attention on East Timor while parliamentary delegations and committees allow a much deeper investigation of the issues and discussions with Indonesian officials. The Human Rights Subcommittee of the Australian Parliament has passed unanimous resolutions supporting the release of Xanana and restricting military cooperation to those forms which do not increase the Indonesian military's ability to repress people. Democrat policy is for the immediate cessation of military aid.

Garrie Gibson described Australia as a 'guard dog keeping the wolves at bay as the faithful shepherd for Indonesia'. Australia's policy of 'quiet persuasion' had, he considered, failed as Indonesia continues to thumb its nose at the world. There is little real evidence for the Government's claim that Australia's positive relationship with Indonesia gives us some influence over its actions in East Timor. Instead Australia has rebuffed President Clinton for raising human rights publicly with Indonesia, and it has neglected to seek a coordinated international response to East Timor from the US, Japan, New Zealand and other Asia/Pacific nations.

The final declaration of the recent International Parliamentary Conference on East Timor included support for multi-national parliamentary human rights delegations to East Timor and direct pressure on the World Bank to influence Indonesia. **Gibson** announced that he will introduce a private member's bill into the Australian Parliament in August 1995 to ban defence cooperation between Australia and any nation whose armed forces violate the human rights of their own citizens and would allow direct parliamentary scrutiny of any defence cooperation arrangement with other countries.

Sidney Jones discussed other parliamentary initiatives. There are two types of Parliamentary delegations. The first involves outspoken representatives who test access and raise awareness in their own countries. The second seeks concrete improvements or conflict resolution and should involve people who have credibility with the Indonesian Government (eg visit of U.S. Senator Charles Robb to Xanana). Setting conditions on aid that already exists might be more productive than cutting aid off. Some international fora like the CGI (Consultative Group on Indonesia) meeting have been inadequately used to raise human rights issues.

In discussion it was suggested that a difficulty with the Portuguese position is that they do not acknowledge that they failed to maintain order thus giving some governments (like Japan) the excuse of saying that Indonesia was forced to intervene. ❋

7.

East Timorese Initiatives

Armindo Maia (University of East Timor)
Joao Mario Saldanha (Harvard University)
Salvador Ximenes Soares
(Member of the Indonesian Parliament/Proprietor of Suara Timor Timur*)*

This session focussed on the views of the people of East Timor and some of the steps that have been taken to rebuild civil society within East Timor.

Armindo Maia reflected on the role of intellectuals in Asian nationalist movements - some were easily absorbed into the colonial governments while others were able to provide intellectual leadership and organization to the nationalist movements. Under the Portuguese East Timorese students also used to meet in illegal discussion clubs. Under Indonesian rule, it is only since 1989 that dissident voices have emerged among East Timorese students in Indonesian universities.

There are three types of students: those who are apolitical and concentrate on their studies; others who are actively involved in the clandestine movement; and a middle group who favour substantial change in East Timor but who do not declare their position. Probably the majority favour either greater autonomy or a referendum leading to eventual independence. In Dili, two NGOs provide an avenue for thinking about the future of East Timor - one, Sapiente, discusses peace initiatives while another, Duc in Altem, is a think tank for the provincial government.

Mario Saldanha looked first at the economic changes in East Timor since 1984. Economic growth averaged 7% between 1984-87 and was

11.3% in 1992. This compared favourably with 5% and 7% in West Timor and 5% for Indonesia as a whole. Indonesia says that it spent $US 650 million since 1976. Economic development is one of Indonesia's main arguments for its rule in East Timor. But the reality is different.

Much of this money is spent on imported goods or goes to salaries of the many Indonesian migrants employed in the civil service. Native East Timorese must compete against these newcomers and they also receive low prices for their own products like coffee while imported goods are expensive. Political instability has affected agriculture - under Portuguese rule, East Timor was self-sufficient in rice but today 75% of the rice fields are not cultivated because the irrigation schemes are damaged and political instability prevents East Timorese seasonal workers coming to the rice growing areas. So economic achievements are no longer a powerful tool for Indonesian diplomacy. A political solution must be the priority.

He compared East Timor with two other annexations - Goa which has been a success and Eritrea which completely failed. India took great care to respect Goa's distinct culture after it was annexed in 1961. It ensured that Goans kept control of their territory and held a referendum in which Goans chose to become a union territory rather than merging with the neighbouring state of Maharastra. Unlike East Timor, Goans were relatively well off and were quite familiar with Indian society. Many were already keen to be part of India. Eritrea was a complete contrast. Ethiopia over-rode a UN settlement that provided for internal autonomy. The Eritreans received no help from the UN and fought a successful 30 year war against Ethiopia for their complete independence.

In East Timor, Indonesia sought quick results rather than a gradual transition. It encouraged migration from Indonesia which the East Timorese see as a threat and the Indonesian constitution, unlike that of India, does not allow provinces to have a big role in economic and political affairs. **Saldanha** argued that there might be a middle ground between complete integration and independence - East Timor could have a loose association with Indonesia but maintain its own judicial system and internal administration. The Indonesian elite fear that greater autonomy for East Timor will spread to other provinces but he believes that East Timor is special because the 1976 law integrating East Timor into Indonesia recognizes its special status and there is an (unimplemented) 1974 law which allows for decentralized regional government.

Saldanha suggested that a team of East Timorese, Indonesians and Portuguese politicians, academics and professionals examine the options and report to both governments and the UN. The East Timorese resistance movement and the Portuguese might see this as a concession to integration but the report need not be binding. Rather it would be a way of moving the situation forward and the very process of dialogue might improve the actual situation in East Timor. For Indonesia, the difficulty will be that the issue of sovereignty is exposed to discussion but in reality this is not internationally recognized anyway. One difficult issue for the committee will be how to finance an autonomous East Timor.

The recent Austrian talks bought together two generations of East Timorese who, although chosen by the UN, represented the sentiments of most East Timorese. All participants felt that they had gained in the final declaration (see Appendix 2) but unfortunately the Indonesian Government objected to a reference to the 1982 UN resolution stating the need for an internationally recognized solution for East Timor. Indonesia has never accepted this resolution. However he felt that it would be unwise for Indonesia to object to another round of inter-Timorese talks being held before the next meeting between the Portuguese and Indonesian Foreign Ministers (presumably early in 1996).

So there are three paths forward - the next meeting of Foreign Ministers could set up a working group to study the 'middle ground', the intra-East Timorese talks should continue and the meetings of Indonesian and Portuguese Foreign Ministers with different groups of East Timorese should continue (Alatas has already met Ramos Horta but the Portuguese Foreign Minister has yet to meet East Timorese supporting integration or the 'middle ground')

Salvador Ximenes also saw dialogue as the best way to achieve a peaceful solution. One of his aims is to develop institutions that will promote a more just life. *Suara Timor Timur* (*STT*) is just 2 years old and last year the Catholic Church set up its own radio station (Nain Teto - Our Lady). *STT* started with limited funds and some groups doubted its political independence but he believes that it has now won widespread acceptance. It has 2,000 subscribers and is distributed to every part of East Timor and if there is a production delay there are always calls asking what has happened. Initially STT was distributed to Jakarta but this had to stop when there was no payment. STT has 22 journalists who receive about Rp100,000 ($A75) a month. Most are serving a 3 year apprenticeship. STT was able to report every day of the Burg Schlaining talks and has never received written instructions to censor articles.

All three speakers spoke of the difficulty that East Timorese graduates found in getting full scholarships to study in Australia. This discussion continued in the workshop and focussed on the Burg Schlaining talks. **Saldanha** described them as a window of opportunity and hopes that future meetings will be based on the common points of agreement. Although **Armindo Maia** also hopes for a second meeting he is not so confident that it will occur because it will be increasingly difficult to satisfy the Indonesian condition that East Timor's political future not be discussed. The meaning of the term 'middle ground' was also raised - is it the final answer or is it a first step to the final answer ? He pointed out that there are several positions:

a. independent within Indonesia;
b. total independence;
c. 27th province, treated the same;
d. 27th province but not even treated the same as other provinces. ⁂

7.

International Law & Self-determination

Pedro Leite (International Platform of Jurists for East Timor)
Hon George Lambert (Retired Family Law Court Judge) Jeremy Sheamur (Australian National University)

***Pedro Pinto Leite and George Lambert** both discussed the recent International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision on the case brought by Portugal against Australia for signing the Timor Gap treaty.*

Portugal asserted that Australia had infringed the rights of the people of East Timor to self-determination and to permanent sovereignty over its natural resources and that it had contravened Security Council resolutions. Both speakers were disappointed by the decision. The court declared it was unable to decide on the merits of the case because Indonesia, which had clearly acted illegally by invading East Timor, refused to accept the court's jurisdiction. However the court clearly recognized that East Timor has a continuing right to self-determination. Two dissenting opinions criticized Senator Evans' statement that Australia accepts the East Timorese right to self-determination but holds that this right must be exercised within the framework of Indonesian sovereignty just as before 1975 Australia recognized the reality of Portuguese sovereignty.

One judge said that self-determination had to be voluntary and **Leite** argued that Australia's recognition of *de jure* Indonesian control actually denies the full right of self-determination to the East Timorese. Leite looked at the attitude of the UN to Portugal's colonies. Portugal tried during the 1950s to argue that its colonies were really overseas provinces but the UN decided that their people did not enjoy the same rights as Portuguese citizens. Only South Africa and Spain accepted this description while the rest of the UN, including Australia, accepted Portuguese sovereignty over its colonies only as an Administering Power that had an obligation to decolonize the territories. These were the real terms that Australia accepted Portuguese sovereignty over East Timor. **Leite** argued that the court should be able to hear cases even when countries did not accept its jurisdiction.

George Lambert presented a well-documented paper arguing from international law that East Timor remains a 'colonial people' under the terms of the UN Charter, a condition fundamentally caused by continuing aggression by the State of Indonesia. He noted that a lasting peace must be based on a clear knowledge of historical truth and of the wishes of the East Timorese people. He supports a UN Fact Finding Committee to recommend a process to resolve the conflict.

Jeremy Shearmur examined the principle of self-determination and concluded that its universal applicability raises some important problems. He suggested that it might be better to raise concerns in the framework of the idea of civil society rather than self-determination.

⁂

8.

Reconciliation

Dr George Aditjondro (Murdoch University)
Louise Crowe (Northern Territory University)
James Dunn (former consul to East Timor)
Professor Akihisa Matsuno (Osaka University)

This session examined different aspects of 'reconciliation'.

George Aditjondro analysed the lessons that might be drawn from Indonesia's support for an independence movement in Brunei during the early 1960s. Tun Azahari's party wanted to replace the Sultan of Brunei, and other political parties in the British colonies of Sabah and Sarawak also sought to join an independent Brunei rather than becoming part of the Malaysian federation. Indonesia supported this movement militarily (*konfrontasi*) and feared that Malaysia was another attack on its unity following US support for regional rebellions in the 1950s.

'Confrontation' only ended when Suharto overthrew Sukarno and eventually Brunei did not join Malaysia, preferring instead to use its oil wealth to become a quasi-independent state (with strong links to Singapore). ASEAN was born from the ashes of *konfrontasi*. This case shows that history can be turned back - for East Timor, it will not be reversed by the Indonesian army but perhaps by a fundamentally new regime in Jakarta or by the heroic example of the new generation of young East Timorese.

James Dunn reflected on the different meanings of 'reconciliation'. Generally it suggests that the different parties find a sound basis for a permanent, harmonious relationship. But international law and UN resolutions are more specific. Reconciliation should reflect the wishes of the population and it should be tested by some type of referendum.

He doubts that there are any really apt parallels for East Timor. The Baltic States had been part of the Russian Empire but were independent when they were illegally absorbed by the USSR in the early 1940s. Gorbachev's admission that the absorption was illegal paved the way for their independence. India's annexation of Goa respected Goan culture and bought a more democratic form of government. By contrast, starting a real reconciliation process in East Timor will be very difficult. The East Timorese have experienced gross violations of their rights and yet most Indonesians know little of this. One important lesson from the Baltic States and Australia's attempt at reconciliation with the Aboriginal peoples is that aggressors clearly acknowledge history and the suffering that they have caused.

Indonesia takes a narrow view of 'reconciliation'. It seeks to persuade East Timorese to accept integration by stressing 'development' spending. But many East Timorese have been marginalized by this 'development'. Past Australian statements used the same approach - criticisms of Indonesia's occupation were accompanied by praising Indonesia's 'development' efforts and condemning Portuguese rule. In fact **Dunn** saw little economic difference between East and West Timor before 1975.

Neither Australia, the EU nor the USA have clear policies on reconciliation or self-determination for East Timor. But both Australia and the US could help by admitting their compliance and failure to discourage Indonesia's invasion. Indeed Australia's recent support for some form of self-determination is compromised by Australia's *de jure* recognition of East Timor. **Dunn** concluded that Jakarta would have to radically change its policies before the East Timorese will give careful consideration to any form of 'reconciliation'. He believes that governments would prefer a comfortable 'diplomatic solution' and have little will to press Indonesia to acknowledge the truth despite the fact that Indonesian democracy would be strengthened by this.

Louise Crowe discussed the role of the Catholic Church in promoting peace in East Timor. The Catholic Church has changed from being a part of the Portuguese colonial administration to being the only independent institution in East Timor. The far-reaching organization of the Church offers an alternative to the forced 'Indonesianisation' of East Timor. Church services use Tetum and offer one of the few officially permitted forms of public meeting. Its schools and clinics are much more trusted than the better resourced Indonesian network because they stress the importance of the people's involvement. However its work in this area is limited by Indonesian suspicion of any organization not under their control. Parish committees for liturgy or pastoral work, let alone for welfare or human rights are hard to form. The Church can also influence public opinion though Bishop Belo's letters and the church radio station, and it has been an influential source of information for the outside world. But the Timorese Church is isolated - the lack of clear Vatican support for the removal of Indonesian forces has produced some disappointment in Timor and confusion in overseas churches on how to best serve the needs of the Church in East Timor.

Akihisa Matsuno presented an analysis of the 'Balibo Declaration'. Indonesia has always claimed that on November 29, 1975 six leaders of the four non-Fretilin East Timorese political parties asked for integration with Indonesia and Indonesian protection for the Timorese who were 'living under Fretilin terror'. Little is really known of the circumstances in which it was drawn up and three signatories have already rejected it. Comparing the eight different versions, he concluded that the original version was based on the misleading information that Portugal accepted Fretilin's declaration of independence on November 28, 1975. The version circulated by Indonesia at the UN omitted a statement regretting that the Timorese people were not freely able to choose their own destiny. Matsuno believes that the original signatories were only asking for personal protection and assistance to restore peace and order so that there could be a genuine referendum. ❋

Final Reports on Workshops

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1. People's initiative workshop.

Chris Adams reported on three kinds of responses.

* *Community education*

This includes getting East Timor onto the curriculum (particularly through subjects such as international studies at the high school level) and into public consciousness by enhancing the East Timor collection in local libraries, making greater use of the Catholic media, running stalls, wearing badges and making sure that the East Timor message is put across at community events such as Hiroshima Day.

* *Linking communities in Australia and East Timor*

Some activities already underway in Melbourne, West Australia and Queensland include twinning Catholic parishes and schools in Australia and East Timor. Activities include fundraising, letter writing between students, support for projects and getting East Timor into the curriculum. There are also exchanges between religious orders (especially the Salesians) focussing mostly on health.

There is now a growing interest in the Aboriginal movement here of other struggles in the region and an increasing commitment to act on those struggles.

* *Lobbying and advocacy work*

Important elements of this are:

(a) continuing demonstrations however small, particularly when they are associated with the visits of key Indonesian officials;

(b) visits and letters to local parliamentarians with the possible formation of an electoral lobby on East Timor and targeting key electorates (recognizing the significant differences between ALP resolutions, caucus and the cabinet on the question of East Timor);

(c) targeting key policy making institutions such as Dept of Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister, Defence and Primary Industry and Energy which is responsible for administering the Timor Gap Treaty;

(d) targeting oil companies, particularly those operating in the Timor Gap (eg actions by Catholic Worker community against Petroz Oil in Brisbane);

(e) lobbying AusAid to ensure that our aid program to Indonesia takes up issues such as good governance and does not exclude East Timor from useful programs such as a planned HIV/AIDS project for Eastern Indonesia. The DIFF facility which subsidizes bids by Australian companies can also be targeted.

(f) looking at the work of the Australia Indonesia Institute and asking for more appropriate targeting of its activities (Richard Woolcott is the current chair);

(g) looking for accurate descriptions of East Timor in the media (e.g. not describing the resistance movement as rebels and referring to it as an occupied territory rather than a province of Indonesia).

Information sharing (eg via email) and coordinated letter-writing activities are very important although total coordination of activities may not be possible or desirable since East Timor now draws support from all parts of the political spectrum. Finally we should draw on powerful symbols within the Australian context - such as the Timor Gap, Aboriginal reconciliation etc.

2. University and institutional initiatives

Jefferson Lee reported that this workshop looked at past actions and future opportunities. Professor Barbedo circulated a two page document on the Oporto University symposium which we recommend that a copybe circulated to other universities. Barbedo proposed that six international conferences (similar to this ANU one) be held around the world at various universities between April 1996 and April 1997. Oporto University could act as a loose coordinating secretariat for these conferences. The growth in understanding about East Timor in Germany in the last year shows how effective they can be.

The conference of the International Peace Research Association at the University of Queensland from July 8-12, 1996 will offer opportunities to discuss East Timor both in plenary sessions and the 20 proposed panels. Any international speakers on East Timor at this conference should also travel to other Australian cities (again Oporto University may be able to assist with fares for speakers from the Indonesian democracy movement and East Timor).

In Australian Universities, East Timor is not yet an issue where, like the Holocaust or Japanese atrocities in World War II, people realize that they should have a moral position. Sometimes it is seen as an issue that is only raised by left wing activists whereas a more broadly based campaign is needed to organize visting speakers and exhibitions, film nights, distribution of education kits and leaflet distribution at conferences like the annual ANU Indonesia Update conference. One example of this is the national petition against the Timor Gap Treaty initiated by Melbourne University student, Jim Aubrey. Jim will run against Senator

Evans in the seat of Holt at the next Federal election. Campus groups could also raise consciousness through fundraising to assist East Timorese students who have had their scholarships cancelled after conflict with the Indonesian authorities.

A directory of East Timor studies is very desirable. This could list courses involving an East Timor case study or which allow thesis topics on East Timor. Current examples are courses on international treaties, genocide and human rights at the University of NSW, on Australia-Asia media relations at Deakin and University of Canberra and in courses on non-violent options for conflict resolution and self determination within the peace studies course at the University of Queensland. Such a directory could be publicized in journals like *Arena*, *Inside Indonesia*, *Social Alternatives* and the *Pacific News Bulletin* and on the internet. It would dispel the idea that East Timor is the preserve of experts on Indonesia, some of whom are quite reluctant to raise the issue for fear that it might jeopardize their research visas.

3. International and regional initiatives workshop

Pat Walsh reported that this workshop looked for ways that the relatively successful promotion of East Timor at the UN and in some overseas countries could be duplicated in our region.

Actions within Australia

(a) The workshop predicted that a Howard coalition government would have a weaker policy on East Timor and saw the need for two approaches. First to talk to parliamentarians to develop a stronger pro-Timor constituency and secondly for a coordinated approach to the Government (particularly the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister and local MPs) to win substantial policy advances on East Timor and on the promotion of democracy in Indonesia.

(b) Australia ought to encourage regional groupings like

ASEAN and the South Pacific Forum to support a just settlement in East Timor and it should promote close cooperation with the US, Japan and the EU to strengthen international support for the UN's search for a settlement in East Timor. It should also end its verbal war with Portugal.

(c) Australian Ministers should have a single policy which has the clear support of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence. At present, the Foreign Minister alone addresses East Timor without support from other sections of government, showing how effectively the government has isolated the issue from the wider relationship with Indonesia.

(d) Australia's present policy is restricted to internal self-determination. This is inconsistent with the principle of self-determination as stated in key UN instruments and represents a derogation from internationally accepted principles.

(e) Australia and other governments should support stronger resolutions at the UN Commission on Human Rights and to raise East Timor at the annual meeting of aid donors to Indonesia (the Consultative Group on Indonesia)

(f) Australia should explore ways of strenghtening civil society in East Timor by, for example, supporting insitutions like the University of East Timor, the local media, non-governmental organisations and church bodies.

(g) The East Timorese people should be actively consulted to produce clear guidelines on the type of aid projects, both from NGOs and governments, that are acceptable. East Timorese opinions about an Australian consulate in Dili should be actively sought.

Actions in the region

We also looked at steps which people in regional networks can take to highlight the injustice and breakdown of international order in East Timor.

(a) Using regional mechanisms and existing networks

Politically smart targeting of regional mechanisms like ASEAN, ESCAP (the UN Centre in Bangkok) and regional NGOs, so that, for example ESCAP could be approached on the economic situation in East Timor and Greenpeace on the environment in East Timor.

We felt that the APCET conference had raised the profile of East Timor but that we are not really tapping into the strong NGO networks in Asia and the stronger democratic institutions in Korea, Thailand and Taiwan. We should be contacting, encouraging and assisting womens', environment, human rights, church and inter-faith networks to see how they can assist the people of East Timor. The forthcoming Beijing Womens' Conference is an excellent opportunity to strengthen the involvement of the womens' movement with East Timor.

(b) Parliamentary initiatives

Parliamentarians for East Timor should broaden its network to include State Parliamentarians and use parliamentary forums to mobilize regional parliamentarians for East Timor. There is an increasing link between East Timorese and the Indonesian democracy movement and there is a role for a new organization 'Parliamentarians for Democracy in Indonesia'.

(c) Pressure on the Indonesian Government

The recent controversy over General Mantiri shows that we need to maintain a database on Indonesian military officers, particularly those who were involved between 1975-89. Indonesia's nominees for ambassadors in other countries should also be scrutinized, if not by governments then by citizens groups. Another proposal for an International War Crimes Tribunal on East Timor needs careful study and advice from international lawyers and judicial experts. Some argued that it would put stronger pressure on Indonesia while others thought that it conflicts with the emphasis in this conference on dialogue and peacemaking.

Finally we emphasize that we must empower people to act from where they are at. These suggestions look at a few of the available levels of action - there are many others.

4. East Timorese and Indonesian initiatives

Patsy Thatcher reported that participants in this workshop looked for steps that should be taken to find a non-violent solution for East Timor. They were conscious of the need to find ways to increase political pressure on Indonesia without causing increased repression and hardship for the East Timorese people.

Indonesian participants told of the formation of SPRIM (*Solidaritas Perjuangan Rakyat Indonesia dengan Maubere* - Maubere and Indonesian People's Solidarity Struggle). This is a coalition group which will carry out education campaigns about East Timor within Indonesia. They noted that Indonesian parliamentarians rarely discuss East Timor and talked about the need for groups to convince them to pay attention to the situation there.

One of the strengths of this conference is that East Timorese are talking and listening to each other. Everyone stressed that people in East Timor must also have a guaranteed forum for discussion and ultimately a referendum to determine their wishes.

We were told that a group of ABRI officers had been discussing the East Timor issue and, recognizing that there can be no solution without

ABRI involvement, we recommend that papers from this conference be sent to these officers if they can be identified.

Material aid for the people of East Timor from NGOs, governments and community groups should be increased.

We also stressed the need to protect people who take a stand on human rights issued. Important steps would be to get Indonesia to ratify the U.N. Convention Against Torture (which it signed in 1985) and to give open access to East Timor to Indonesian and East Timorese lawyers who are definitely able and willing to offer free legal aid to East Timorese. We also supported the proposal that a UN Human Rights Office be established in East Timor and that a civil police force be established in East Timor (as recommended by the UN Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial executions). ❋

Appendix 1
List of speakers at the conference

Dr George Aditjondro
Asia Research Centre,
Murdoch University
Mr Rui Goulart de Avila
Portuguese Ambassador in Australia
Senator Vicki Bourne
Australian Democrats
Foreign Affairs Spokesperson
Dr Peter Carey
Trinity College, Oxford University
Mr Renato Constantino Jr
President of Asia-Pacific Conference on East Timor
Dr Harold Crouch
Research School of
Asia and Pacific Studies, ANU
Louise Crowe
Northern Territory University
James Dunn
ex-Australian Consul in East Timor
Professor Richard Falk
Centre for International Studies,
Princeton University.
Mr Liem Sioe Liong
TAPOL
(British Campaign for
Human Rights in Indonesia).
Mr Bob Lowry
Defence Studies Centre,
Australian Defence Force Academy
Dr Michael van Langenberg
Dept of Indonesian Studies,
University of Sydney
Dr Herb Feith
Centre for Southeast Asian Studies,
Monash University
Mr Garrie Gibson MP
Australian Labor Party and co-chair of Parliamentarians for East Timor
Dr Geoffrey Gunn
Nagoya University
Hon George Lambert
retired Justice, Family Court of Australia, Brisbane
Mr Pedro Pinto Leite
International Platform of Jurists for East Timor, Holland
Prof Barbedo de Magalhaes
Oporto University, Portugal
Mr Armindo Maia
Vice-Rector, University of East Timor
Prof Akihisa Matsuno
Osaka University of Foreign Studies
Mr Joao Mariano Saldanha de Sousa
Harvard University
Mr Salvador Ximenes Soares
member of the Indonesian DPR
and editor of *Suara Timor Timur*
Dr Jeremy Shearmur
Dept of Political Science, ANU
Mr Herbin Siahaan
Joint Committee for the Defence of East Timorese, Jakarta
Mr Pat Walsh
Australian Council for Overseas Aid
Human Rights Office

Appendix 2

Burg Schlaining Declaration

The Timorese, meeting in the All Inclusive Intra-Timorese dialogue on June 3-5 1995 in Schlaining, Austria, in the framework of the initiatives of the United Nations Secretary General:

Expressing their gratitude and greetings to the Secretary General and his staff for this initiative:

Taking note with appreciation and thanking the generous hospitality of the Austrian Government in welcoming the participants;

Expressing their gratitude for the voluntary contribution by several countries towards the holding of this meeting;

Recognising the invaluable contribution of the Catholic Church in East Timor in the past and at present in East Timor;

Bearing in mind the contribution of His Excellency Rev. Dom Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo in the course of this Intra-Timorese dialogue;

Noting that in spite of the frank and open spirit in which this Intra-Timorese dialogue was conducted, the fundamental different political options are unchanged;

DECIDE TO:

1. Salute the presence of H.E. Rev. Dom Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, Apostolic Administrator of the Diocese of Dili, for his invaluable contribution in the course of the debate, such as proposals for concrete measures that were agreed upon with a view to improving the physical and spiritual conditions of the lives of the people of East Timor;

2. Propose to the UN Secretary General the holding of another Intra-

Timorese dialogue in the same framework in which this one was undertaken with a view to continuing the debate on the issues annexed, preceding each round of negotiations between the diplomatic heads of Portugal and Indonesia;

3. Reaffirm the need to implement the necessary measures in the field of human rights and in the various areas with a view to promoting peace, stability, justice and social harmony;

4. Reaffirm the necessity for the social and cultural development of East Timor on the basis of the preservation of the cultural identity of the people, including tradition, religion, history and language as well as the teaching of Tetun and Portuguese;

5. Expresses the need to create the basis for the involvement of all East Timorese without discrimination of any sort in the development of East Timor in every sphere of human life in a climate of mutual understanding, tolerance and harmony;

6. Affirm the importance of the ongoing negotiations between the governments of Portugal and Indonesia under the auspices of the Secretary General of the United Nations with a view to finding a just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable solution to the question of East Timor according to the provisions, letter and spirit of the UN General Assembly resolution 37/30.

7. Register with appreciation the consultations undertaken by the United Nations with the various shades of Timorese opinion, aiming at their gradual involvement, as well as the availability of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Portugal and Indonesia for direct dialogue with Timorese personalities;

8. Request the good offices of the UN Secretary General and of the governments of Portugal and Indonesia to facilitate the free movement of the Timorese families to and from East Timor.

Burg Schlaining, 5 June 1995

Appendix 3

Request for Papers

Please note the cost per paper is AUD$1.00

- ○ George Aditjondro *From 'Ganyang Malaysia' to 'Ganyang Fretilin': Lessons learned from the Konfrontasi Period that may be relevant in ending the Indonesian Occupation of East Timor*
- ○ Rui Goulart de Avila *Statement on Behalf of Portugal at the Australian National University Conference on 'Peacemaking Initiatives for East Timor'*
- ○ Vicki Bourne *The Relevance of Parliamentary Initiatives*
- ○ Renato Constantino, Jr. *APCET and ASEAN Solidarity*
- ○ Louise Crowe *The Role of the Catholic Church*
- ○ James Dunn *East Timor - Reconciliation Process*
- ○ Herb Feith *Xanana Gusmao, The Mandela Role And The Argument For Internationally Guaranteed Autonomy*
- ○ Geoffrey C. Gunn *The 'Blue Book' and East Timor*
- ○ Garrie Gibson *Australia the Guard Dog: Keeping the Wolves at Bay as the Faithful Shephard for Indonesia*
- ○ Jose Ramos Horta *The CNRM PEACE Initiative and the Israeli-Palestinian Agreement on Self-Government*
- ○ Miles Kupa *Australia's Approach to East Timor*
- ○ George Ernest Lambert *Real Politik v International Law*
- ○ Pedro Pinto Leite *The Significance of the recent International Court of Justice Ruling*
- ○ Liem Soei Liong *The Declining Political Role of Abri in East Timor*
- ○ Bob Lowry *Indonesian Military Perspectives on East Timor*
- ○ Joao Mariano Saldanha *East Timor and Conflict Resolution: the Political Economy of Middle Ground Approach*
- ○ Transcript of final session (reports by conference rapporteurs)

Name: ______________________

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Number of papers _____ x $1 = _____

Please, do not send cash! Make out your cheque to the Australian National University. Send request form and cheque to Dr Michael Salla, Department of Political Science, Arts Faculty, Australian National University, ACT 0200